| <<< Back to Part I | Part III >>> |
|
CBIVA Sound-off Summer 1994 Issue The first part of SOUND-OFF's synopsis of the war in China-Burma-India in 1944 was carried in the Spring issue. In that treatment we left the Second Arakan Campaign with a British victory and the forces of the Northern Combat Area Command (two Chinese Divisions and Merrill's Marauders in the action so far) had driven the Japanese out of the Hukawng Valley and stood poised to strike for Myitkyina, hopefully before the onset of the monsoons. The Chindits had completed their glider and transport landings behind the Japanese lines and had consolidated their position with roadblocks on the Mandalay-Myitkyina rail line at "White City." Their leader, Gen. Orde Wingate, had just been killed in an air crash and command had been assumed by Gen. W. D. A. Lentaigne. The Japanese 15th Army, nearly 100,000 combat-tested troops, had invaded India, besieged Imphal and Kohima for 88 days, but had been unable to take these Commonwealth strongholds. They now were a defeated, diseased, starving, ineffectual force which was poised to retreat back into Burma. In eastern China the Japanese had launched Ichi-Go, were meeting little resistance and had taken Changsha. In Yunnan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had given the go-ahead to the Y-Forces to retake the Japanese-held portion of the Province and meet with the X-Forces in Burma. 2nd Arakan Campaign While the Commonwealth forces In the Arakan had been successful in largely wiping out the Japanese troops which had earlier encircled them, they had not broken the line which prevented them from moving to their goal of Akyab. In March and April, in extremely bitter fighting, the British XV Corps gradually fought its way through the Maungdaw position. Having broken through, the corps was about to continue its advance to Akyab when it was forced to halt and send reinforcements to the Imphal front (see last issue). No further activities took place in this area from May to December 1944 because of the monsoon season. |
| North Burma After the victories of Shadazup and Walabum (April 8), Stilwell paused until convinced that the British would be successful in preventing the Japanese from severing his supply line in Assam. In an effort to capture the target city of Myitkyina before the arrival of the monsoons, the Marauders and two Chinese divisions were sent on a secret march over the high, extremely rugged ridge between the Mogaung and Irrawaddy valleys to take Myitkyina. The Marauders are now commanded by Lt. Col. Charles N. Hunter who succeeded the ill Gen. Merrill. The force has been reduced by casualties and disease to 1400 men, less than half of the number which departed Ledo. On May 17-18, the attack quickly gained control of the Myitkyina airfield. Supplies and reinforcements were rushed in by air while the field was still under Japanese small-arms fire. Attempts by the exhausted and disease-ridden troops to seize the city of Myitkyina were repulsed and, with fresh Japanese reinforcements crossing from the east bank of the Irrawaddy, the fresh, air-transported Chinese reinforcement were also repulsed. So, while the Japanese 15th Army is besieging Imphal and Kohima, the American-Chinese forces are trying to invest Myitkyina and the Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions are moving down the Mogaung Valley where, the 22nd (with reinforcements from China) captured the important communications hub of Kamaing with a good, old-fashioned bayonet charge. Soon after, the Chinese were joined by the 77th Brigade of Chindits and in a joint Sino-British operation captured the town of Mogaung on June 26. The Japanese defenders were operating on a "hold-to-death" order because their high command could not tolerate any Allied forces operating behind their lines while they were trying to take Imphal and Kohima. As an aside, both the Marauders and Chindits had long overstayed the ninety-day period which was the maximum it was believed a long range penetration force could be effective. Stilwell was afraid their withdrawal to hospitals and rest areas through the Chinese lines would cause serious damage to the morale of the Chinese troops who had started from Ledo earlier and had no rotation to anticipate. The morale and health problems need far more space than this synopsis permits but the books are available for your edification. Despite the monsoon, the Allies continued to press against Myitkyina. The Japanese defenders maintained a line of communications across the Irrawaddy and some reinforcements and supplies were available. The defense was the typical, valorous, bitter Japanese effort and, although seldom more than 3500 effectives at any time, the defenders held off the poorly organized Allied attackers. (Although only approximately 700 Japanese were present when the first Chinese and Marauders took the airfield, the first reinforcements flown in were primarily antiaircraft and service units instead of infantry.) |
| When the siege ended August 3rd, 600 of the remaining defenders slipped across the Irrawaddy, 187 prisoners were taken and their commander. Gen. Mizukami, had committed hari-kari (seppuku). With the capture of Myitkyina, the road from Ledo could be pushed forward and the airways to China had been considerably improved. With no hostile planes threatening them from the airfields of Myitkyina, the Hump pilots were no longer forced to fly over the higher ranges and were able to more safely carry heavier loads. Second Chindit Expedition In the first installment of this synopsis we left the Chindits at Mawlu in their blocking position called "White City." Their leader. Brig. Orde Wingate, had been killed in an air crash, and he had been succeeded by Maj. Gen. W.D.A. Lentaigne. Newly-arrived Japanese reinforcements began to concentrate against "White City" and Lentaigne decided to abandon the base. Now under Stilwell's command and a part of Northern Area Combat Command, he established a new base, "Blackpool" near Hopin, about midway between Mawlu and Mogaung. Blackpool was soon attacked by strong Japanese forces and a violent battle raged. The hard-pressed Chindits, close to exhaustion and having suffered heavy casualties, withdrew again, this time to the relative safety of the mountains farther west. The Chindits gathered in the vicinity of Indawgyi Lake and in June and July flying boats were used to evacuate the sick and wounded back to India. Meanwhile, the two brigades that had suffered the least continued to act in concert with Stilwell's forces. As we have already seen, the 77th Brigade had acted with the Chinese in the capture of Mogaung. The 3rd West African Brigade of Chlndits was being used by Stil-well to protect his right flank against possible counterattack up the Mandalay-Mogaung railway line. This Brigade was ordered to advance down the railroad from Mogaung to seize Pinbaw. They were immediately stopped by Japanese defensive positions on the railroad south of Mogaung. The British 36th Division, under Major Gen. Francis W. Festlng was transferred to Stilwell's command on July 7 to replace the now exhausted Chindits. |
 |
| During the Battle of Myitkyina, one American plane burns while another circles the field. The picture was made up and painted by Jim Fletcher and photographed by Joe Sulkowsky. |
| The Railroad Corridor Campaign Flown into Myitkyina, the 36th marched to Mogaung, where they relieved the 3rd West Africans. Festing's troops then fought down the long, sheltered corridor against determined Japanese resistance, during the height of the monsoon season, to take Pinbaw, their objective, on August 28. Gen. Festing, ever-aggressive, then got Stilwell's permission to strike an additional 50 miles down the railroad, driving the Japanese out of a series of hastily prepared defensive positions. Dupuy and Dupuy comment in their "Encyclopedia of Military History" that: "This 100-mile-long campaign was the first instance in modern military history of a large-scale offensive in Southeast Asia during the rain and mud of the monsoon season." |
| Japanese Invasion of India In the first installment we saw the Japanese Fifteenth Army, a force of 100,000 men, cross the Chindwin and the intervening ranges to move into Assam and lay siege on the bases of Imphal and Kohima. After surrounding these bases for 88 days but being unable to invest them, the Fifteenth Army now was also overcome by other enemies. The Japanese had never anticipated that the British would not retreat and abandon their supplies. Those supplies were what the Japanese were counting on to provision the Fifteenth Army while it remained In India. With this source of supplies denied and with the monsoons making large-scale supply operations Impossible in the mountain jungles, they had no choice but to retreat. Slowly and stubbornly, they fell back to the Chindwin Valley, harassed from the air and by pursuing British troops. Amazingly, they never lost cohesion or combat effectiveness. The Fifteenth Army had been virtually ruined, however, by a combination of battle casualties, malaria and starvation. The Japanese lost 65,000 dead, less than half of whom were actual battle casualties. (Only 600 were taken prisoner.) Gen. Slim's Commonwealth forces had suffered 16,700 casualties, amounting perhaps to 25% of its combat power. Ichi-Go In the first installment we found that the Japanese Eleventh Army, 250,000 strong, had occupied Changsha June 19. The first stiff Chinese resistance was at Hengyang, which fell after an eleven day siege on August 9. The 50,000 strong Twenty-third Army had also moved out of Canton. Chinese resistance began to collapse. Methodically, despite the fierce aerial opposition of Chennault's flyers, seven of the US 14th Air Force's 12 airfields were captured and the Japanese movement then turned westward (November 15) to threaten Kunming and Chungking. Operations in Yunnan Many precious, pre-monsoon months had been lost for the Y-Forces In a move across the Salween River gorge against the remaining units of the Japanese 56th Division by the refusal of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to approve the attack. (Units of the 56th had been sent to assist in the defense of Myitkyina.) The 56th was thinly stretched over a 100-mile-front with two strongly fortified locations in Lungling and Tengchung. The retreating Chinese had destroyed the two bridges across the Salween when the Japanese had advanced from Burma two years earlier. A deep, wide, swift, wild river now had to be ferried and the Chinese started their crossings May 11. Two columns were formed; the northern column moving aggressively to invest the walled city of Tengchung in early July. It penetrated the walls through breaches made by supporting fighter-bombers of the 14th AF and after a bitter house-by-house battle, the Chinese annihilated the defenders on September 15. This made available a passable road, via Fort Harrison, to Myitkyina, although the road was never used for military purposes. The southern column had greater difficulty. They had surrounded Lungling less than a month after crossing the Salween but a June 16 counterattack drove the column back. Rallying, the Chinese finally halted the smaller pursuing force and slowly re-established a partial blockade of the city. After the loss of Tengchung, the Japanese again mounted another counterattack, driving the southern column of the Y-Forces almost back to the Salween before events in Burma forced them to abandon the pursuit. Nevertheless, this relatively small Japanese force had prevented the Y-Forces from sweeping all before them and entering Burma along the Burma Road. A key salient for the Japanese was the fortified position on Sung Shan Mountain which overlooked the Burma Road bridge (Hui-tung) and actually controlled six miles of the Burma Road. The southern column had bypassed Sung Shan to attack Lungling. With their failure to take Lungling, the Chinese decided they needed to be able to truck materiel across the rebuilt bridge and down the Road so Sung Shan must be taken. Chinese ineptness and Japanese tenacity prevailed for it took two months, several divisions, artillery barrages, aerial bombing, flame-thrower attacks, and finally, tunneling under the positions and blowing off the top of the mountain to dislodge the Japanese defenders. Of the 1,200 defenders, nine were captured and ten were believed to have escaped. The Chinese dead numbered 7,675. Air Operations Prior to 1944, the Japanese enjoyed air superiority in the skies of both India and Burma and in China were at least in a position to contest. In the first quarter of 1943, the Japanese were able to continue long-range bombing raids against Calcutta and the Hump air bases in Assam. These raids were not very effective and didn't cause a great deal of damage but they harassed the Allies considerably. By the second quarter, as British and American combat air strength built up in India, the Japanese were forced to abandon their raids over the mountains. The Allies then began to carry the war into Burma and soon gained air superiority over much of the country. During the 1943 monsoon lull, the Japanese built up their antiaircraft defenses and rebuilt their over-all air strength in Burma. |
 |
| Members of the Kachin Raiders who risk their lives to obtain information vital to the battling builders of the Ledo Road that will supply China. In defensive position against the Japanese, if you look closely, you can see at least 14 men in the thick jungle. Picture taken by War Correspondent Frank Cancellara of Acme and the Washington Post. |
| Good weather in November of 1943 found the Japanese ready to challenge once again and they began both night and day raids on Calcutta and the Hump bases while their fighters struck back vigorously against any Allied air intrusions over Burma. Slowly, however, the greater numbers and greater skill of the Allied air forces began to assert themselves. By mid-1944, Major Gen. George E. Stratemeyer's Eastern Air Command completely dominated the skies over Burma; this superiority was never to be relinquished. Logistical Air Support General Hoyotaro Kimura replaced Kawabe in command of the Burma Area Army following the disaster of the Japanese Fifteenth Army in its incursion into India. Kimura's strategy for defending Burma in 1944 failed to appreciate Allied air capabilities. The Japanese had failed in their invasion of India because they had been unable to establish and maintain the long lines to supply their troops. But, the Allies did not depend upon such supply lines to support their troops, or to keep up the advance in the jungle. Hundreds of Allied transport planes brought food, ammunition, and all manner of supplies directly to the front-line troops. If there were no nearby airfields where they could land, the airmen dropped these supplies into rice paddy or jungle clearings. Anything that might break was dropped by parachute; everything else was free-dropped. Thus, the Allies' only supply line came through the air, which they controlled completely. And, having driven Japanese combat planes from the skies, the Allies had no worries about air strikes against their bases in India. Combat Air Support The difficulties of surface transportation in jungle areas meant that ground troops had less artillery support than normal, while the potentialities for defense in the jungle increased their need for it. The Chindits, in particular, needed such support for they had no artillery. This deficiency was made up, at least in part, by the extensive direct support which the British and American fighter-bombers were able to provide, since they had no need to engage the nonexistent Japanese air force. Most of the supporting missions were flown by fighter-bombers that dive-bombed strong Japanese positions, then strafed them just before ground attacks. In some instances, where Japanese defenses were particularly strong, light and medium bombers were used to support ground attacks. The Strategic Air Offensive In April and May of 1944, B-29 "Superfortress" bombers began to arrive at bases near Calcutta. Five airfields with extra-long runways had been built with coolie labor near Chengtu in western China. The B-29 was a powerful, heavily-armed plane which could fly over 350 mph, and carry 20,000 pounds of bombs against targets over 1,500 miles from their bases. From India, the first attack was staged June 5 against railway targets at Bangkok, Thailand. The bases in China were used as staging areas for targets in east China and the homeland of Japan, itself. All barracks, repair shops and heavy support equipment were based in India. Fuel was flown over the Hump and stored until a supply sufficient to mount an attack was accumulated. The first strike against Japan was made by 68 planes on June 15 against a steel plant on the Japanese island of Kyushu. Under Major Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the XX Bomber Command attacked targets in Singapore, Indonesia, cities in China and Japan throughout the balance of 1944. By the end of the year, sufficient bases had been established on the islands of the Pacific, much closer to Japan, and the XX Bomber was moved to these bases. The conclusion of this three-part series will be printed in the Fall SOUND-OFF. |
| <<< Back to Part I | Part III >>> |
