LOGISTICS IN THE CBI THEATER, 1942-1945

Part II


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American Air Logistics in the China-Burma-India Theater
During World War II, 1942-1945

By Roger G. Miller, PhD.
Air Force History and Museums Program

(Delivered to the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo Spring 2000)

Source:  CBIVA Sound-off, Fall 2000 Issue

For the Army Air Forces, Air Transport Command and Troop Carrier Command became Its main air logistical organizations. The dividing line between the two was that ATC was a worldwide operation controlled by General Hap Arnold, commander of the U.S. Army Air Forces, and its units, equipment, and personnel were not subject to the powerful wartime theater commanders like Gen. Dwight Elsenhower in Europe, Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the southwest Pacific, and Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten in CBI. ATC operated like a civilian airline. It followed standard routes, maintained regular schedules, and made planned stops at designated airports and airfields. By the end of 1942, its aircraft operated on routes that stretched around the world. ATC was a "table of distribution" organization: its resources were assigned to ATC itself, and ATC Headquarters distributed these based upon immediate requirements, providing the flexibility required to meet world-wide commitments.

Troop Carrier Command squadrons, in contrast, were combat units designed to deliver airborne forces and their equipment directly into combat and then to support those forces during the subsequent fighting. And between missions, troop carrier aircraft provided airlift capability within the theater. Troop carrier units operated under the orders of the theater commanders. In contrast to ATC, TCC was a "table of equipment" organization: each of its units had a standardized organization and sufficient manning to enable It to meet the surges of combat operations.

Beyond organizations, the Army Air Forces had also begun obtaining aircraft capable of performing the roles required by air logistics. The most important of these - and destined to become the most famous - was the ubiquitous Douglas C-47 "Skytrain.". Based on the latest in a series of commercial airliners, the twin-engine, all-metal C-47 became the backbone of Allied military air transport during World War II. The C-47 proved versatile, easy to maintain, and capable of absorbing tremendous abuse. The twin-engine Curtiss C-46 "Commando" also began as a commercial airliner. Its spacious fuselage and high altitude capability made the Commando especially suitable for the Hump. The third transport derived from an airliner was the Douglas C-54 "Skymas-ter," a four-engine aircraft with intercontinental range. The Sky-master featured a tricycle landing gear, giving it a level floor that expedited cargo handling. Finally, the transport version of the B-24D "Liberator" bomber also saw considerable service in CBI. Like the C-54, the four-engine Consolidated C-87 had a tricycle landing gear, tion and boxy fuselage facilitated loading and unloading. A tanker version called the C-109, delivered gasoline and liquid fuel on the Hump run.

It is important to note that few of these aircraft were immediately available. The Army Air Forces had only 254 transports on hand in December 1941. These comprised a motley group of aging and more modern aircraft: Douglas C-33s and C-39s, Beechcraft C-45s, and Lockheed Lodestars. Of the C-47 Skytrain, the Army Air Forces had but 33. The C-46, C-54, and C-87 still waited in the wings. Further, while production would increase dramatically after the war began, the low priority of the CBI meant that it would take time before new aircraft would appear in large numbers.

American air logistics in the China-Burma-India Theater grew out of the presence of several diverse air organizations operating in the region shortly after Pearl Harbor. First, following the fall of Java in the South Pacific, the remnants of Far East Air Force divided, part retreating to Australia and part flying to India, where it formed the nucleus of Tenth Air Force established in March 1942. Second, the American Volunteer Group (AVG), better known as the "Flying Tigers," a fighter outfit commanded by a retired Army Air Corps officer, Claire Lee Chennault, opposed the Japanese attack on Burma with considerable success before retreating to China. Subsequently, the U.S. Army recalled Chennault to active duty and gave him command of the China Air Task Force (CATF) under Tenth Air Force on 4 July 1942. Chennault thus commanded all fighter and bomber units sent to China. In March 1943, China was separated from Tenth Air Force control, and the Army Air Forces activated Fourteenth Air Force under Chennault.


A sign at the Chanyi Airfield in China said
"You made it again -good work!"

Foreseeing the loss of Rangoon, In early 1942, the War Department ordered Tenth Air Force to establish an air transport route from India to China. The result was two organizations, Trans-India Ferry Command to operate between Karachi and Dlnjan In Assam, and the Assam-Burma-China Ferry Command to operate between India and China. Activated in March 1942, Assam-Burma-China Ferry Command's first mission was to fly 30,000 gallons of gasoline to China in support of the Doolittle raid using a few transport aircraft mostly borrowed from civilian airlines.

Stilwell's successors, Lieut. Generals Daniel I. Sultan (pointing) and Albert C. Wedemeyer (standing), pore over a map with Mountbatten (center). Observing the 1945 briefing in Burma is OSS Chief Major General William J. Donovan. Sultan commanded American, Chinese and British troops in northern Burma, while Wedemeyer headed up the U.S. forces in China.

Early plans called for diverting 35 commercial transports to the CBI and operating 100 transports on the Hump by the end of the year. Of the latter, 75 were to operate as U.S. military transports and 25 to be flown by the China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) a civilian airline. CNAC had operated In China for over ten years and flew the original exploratory route to establish a route over the Hump from India to Kunming in 1941. During the war, CNAC made over 35,000 flights and ultimately had over 200 crews and 60 aircraft, mostly C-47s. Early in the war, however, transport aircraft, were among the most critical items; shortages existed in every theater of war. None of the commercial transports reached Karachi until April 1942, and the demand for air transport across the breadth of India delayed the assignment of aircraft to the Hump. By July 1942, there were only 12 CNAC aircraft and nine military transports on the Hump run. Tenth Air Force delivered a meager 80 tons over the Hump in May 1942 and 106 in June.

Ultimately, the Hump operation, under Tenth Air Force, failed to deliver the expected tonnage into China for a number of reasons. First, only 62 C-47s had reached India by mid-December 1942. On these, 15 had been lost or destroyed and others had been diverted to Egypt with Tenth Air Force bombers in June In response to German Gen. Erwln Rommel's drive to El Alamein which threatened the Suez Canal. Further, the remaining transports were also diverted temporarily to other missions such as the evacuation of Allied forces from Burma. A host of problems affected the remaining aircraft. All were overworked and frequently grounded for lack of parts. Airfields were limited and construction delayed. Procedures for flying heavy loads over the Hump remained undeveloped.


Gen. Wm. H. Twiner, Cmdr. India-China Division, ATC (left)
with Cols. Rwst, (center), and Heard (right).

Communications, weather forecasting, navigational aides, and other operational necessities were limited or nonexistent. The air and ground crews were shorthanded and overworked. Primitive living conditions, poor food, shortages of personal necessities, the absence of recreation facilities, and the seemingly endless nature of the job destroyed morale and constrained operations. Further, while the problems that Tenth Air Force faced were faced by all theaters of the war in 1942, they were compounded by the distances involved and the fact that CBI had the lowest priority for supplies, personnel, and equipment.

On 1 December 1942, Air Transport Command took charge of the Hump route, including all aircraft, maintenance facilities, spare parts, and personnel. The interference in this decision was that ATC, acting independently of theater control, was best able to handle all aspects of military air transportation. Col. Edward H. Alexander took command of the new India-China Wing of ATC. Despite ATC's best efforts and tremendous progress, however, the performance of air logistics on the Hump remained behind promises for the next two years. Simply, demands always outstripped capability.

Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, the senior U.S. Army commander in the CBI, saw the reconquest of northern Burma as the only way to ensure the success of the American policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek's forces and concentrated on building a Chinese force capable of taking on the Japanese in Burma. Stilwell desperately required supplies and equipment. On the other hand, General Chennault, the commander of Chiang Kal-shek's air force and soon to be commander of Fourteenth Air Force, convinced both Chiang and Roosevelt that alrpower would provide a cheap, inexpensive way to defeat the Japanese, and he demanded the necessary supplies and equipment, especially gasoline and ammunition. In exchange, Chennault promised to sweep aside the Japanese air force and destroy the industrial centers of Japan. The nod went to Chennault. But the Hump simply could not meet demands, and prevailing conditions meant that it could not even meet planned tonnage figures.

Following the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, General Arnold visited China, where he delivered Roosevelt's promise to increase the number of transports on the Hump from 62 to 137, and to deliver 4,000 tons of supplies per month by March 1943, 7,000 tons by July, and 10,000 tons by September. These goals could not be reached. Aircraft continued to arrive at a slower rate than planned, and airfield construction by the British lagged. Personnel problems continued. Maintenance personnel lacked experience, and many of the pilots had never flown multiengined aircraft. X Air Service Command was full to capacity and could not keep up with third and fourth level maintenance requirements.

To make up some of the shortages, Arnold began sending new larger C-46s to India in place of C-47s. Deliveries of these, however, lagged behind promises. The first C-46s reached Karachi in mid-April and began flying the Hump in May. The Commandos, however, required hundreds of time-consuming modifications, suffered from hydraulic problems, and proved unstable at low speeds. Pilots counted the early Commandos as a menace equal to the terrain and weather on the Hump. The situation gradually improved toward autumn, as British airfield construction progressed and a transition flight training program began to graduate multi-engine pilots. Tonnage figures inched up. The 4,000-ton goal for March was met in August; the 7,000-ton goal originally set for July was met in October 1943.

In early September 1943, ATC commander Lt. Gen. Harold L. George visited the Hump, bringing with him Col. Thomas O. Hardin, a tough, hard-driving airline executive who commanded ATC's Central African Sector. George transferred Hardin to command of the India-China Wing of ATC on 16 September and made him responsible for Hump operations. George also concluded that a sustained flow of spare parts, equipment, and engines was essential. This recognition was the origin of the "Fireball" run, which featured several C-87s and aircrews dedicated specifically to the delivery of essential spares from the United States. This operation, along with the arrival of new C-46s loaded with C-46 parts, increased the number of operational aircraft. The growing numbers of often larger aircraft, additional quantities of trained personnel, expanded airfield construction, and improved facilities and equipment of all kinds increased the Hump's capacity. The 13,399 tons of supplies delivered in January 1944 grew to 23,676 tons by August.


Packing supplies for airdrop. Drums of gasoline are prepared (above),
and eggs are packed by the "country basket" method (below).

Tonnage rose despite the changed tactical situation in Burma during 1944 that caused ATC to divert Hump aircraft to support tactical units. In February 1944, Japanese forces attacked the British XV Corps in Arakan. When the British and American troop carrier squadrons supporting the British ground forces had to be withdrawn for maintenance, ATC transports took their place, dropping some 446 tons of supplies. In March 1944, the Japanese 15th Army launched its major offensive into Assam in northern India, threatening the Assam-Bengal railroad, a major artery for the Hump. During April, C-46s diverted from the Hump delivered 2,100 tons of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies to the beleaguered forces. In April 1944, Stilwell began an offensive south from Ledo against Myitkyina and west from Yunnan across the Salween. In preparation for this effort, Air Transport Command flew over 18,000 troops from Yunnan to staging positions, from which they were transported to the front lines by truck and troop carrier aircraft. After Stilwell captured Myitkyina in May, ATC flew in additional combat troops, engineers, and tons of equipment, including bulldozers, tractors, and road graders.

In September 1944, Brig. Gen. William H. Tunner took command of the India-China Division replacing General Hardin who went home after two exhausting years overseas. Tunner was a "brilliant, dedicated, meticulous leader . . . who worked long hours at an intense pace" and was already well on his way to becoming the U.S. Army Air Forces' "premier authority on air transport." Thanks to Hardin, the "age of big business" in the CBI had already dawned, but under Tunner's rigorous measures, it became second nature.

Tunner instituted a series of innovations and operational changes. Immediately after his arrival, he began a program of hangar and apron construction necessary to put production line maintenance (PLM) into effect. Under PLM, aircraft were towed through a series of work stations where specialists performed specific maintenance tasks at each location.

However, pressure to implement the program proved somewhat counterproductive. Some maintenance lines, hastily established, failed to function properly, and commanders and personnel used to doing things the old ways where a specific crew was responsible for one airplane, delayed implementation or supported the program half-heartedly. Still, Tunner made the system work and later judged PLM a success.

PLM was made possible by assigning one type of aircraft to each base. By early 1945, for example, four bases had 46 C-46s each, three bases had 30 C-87s and C-109s, and one base had 30 C-54s. Assigning one type of aircraft to each base had the additional merit of increasing operational efficiency.

Additionally, Tunner sought to replace the C-87s and C-109s with C-54s because the Consolidated aircraft had a 500 percent greater accident rate than the Douglas transport. This led to the "272 plan," under which the India-China Division would have 272 C-54s by October 1945. The great problem with Tunner's plans was the worldwide shortage of Pratt & Whitney R-2000 engines that powered the C-54. The ATC proposal for dealing with this situation was to return C-54s to Florida for routine engine change and related maintenance. This program required a huge construction effort at Morrison Field, which was finally approved in April 1945.

However, severe shortages in skilled labor handicapped the construction program, and then crippled engine maintenance itself. Military personnel assigned to supervise the program lacked sufficient knowledge and experienced civilian maintenance personnel were in short supply. Further, the aircraft proved to be in poorer condition than expected, often requiring extensive sheet-metal work and fuel-cell repairs. C-54s thus averaged about 34 days at Morrison Field rather than the seven days schedulers planned.


Kickers prepare to drop supplies in north Burma

Tunner also fought Chennault for control of air distribution in China. While Fourteenth Air Force had its own transport, it also frequently commandeered Hump aircraft for local operations in China, upsetting ATC's schedules and scattering the aircraft across the country. To Tunner, delivering supplies to one place in China and leaving them to be distributed by local air transport was unnatural. ATC could do the entire job better. He proposed to base 50 ATC aircraft in China, use them to make deliveries in theater, and release them to the Hump when they were available.

Chennault refused, telling Tunner that any aircraft based in his theater should be under his control. Subsequently, at a critical juncture in the war, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to have two Chinese divisions flown to Upper Burma. This task would normally have been Chennault's responsibility, but Fourteenth Air Force lacked sufficient air transport to support its own combat operations and deliver the troops at the same time. Tunner furnished 50 C-47s and 20 C-46s. The move was successful and proved to be the wedge that opened the door for ATC, which took over local air deliveries in China.

The final major change in Hump operations came in early 1945 following the recapture of Rangoon. Several tactical organizations - including the 7th and 308th Bombardment Groups; 443rd Troop Carrier Group; and the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Combat Cargo Groups, along with two squadrons from the 1st Combat Cargo Group - augmented the Hump airlift with over 200 aircraft operating from bases at Dinjan, Myitkyina, Bhamo, and Luliang. Integrating these units into the Hump operation proved difficult. Troop carrier and combat cargo personnel, who looked down on ATC as being a "non-combat" outfit, resented being "demoted," as they saw it, to a menial operation. They were also offended by having to take a one-week training course on how to fly the Hump. Despite mutual recriminations between two organizations, however, the tactical units made a significant contribution to the tonnage delivered in 1945.

Under Tunner's spurs, and thanks to the almost unlimited resources finally flowing into the CBI, tonnage on the Hump expanded dramatically, rising from 24,715 tons in October 1944 to 44,099 in January 1945, and reaching a peak of 71,042 in July 1945. Perhaps General Tunner should have the last word concerning the significance of air logistics on the Hump:

The war was over, but large-scale airlift, the conception and development of which took place there on the Hump, was just beginning. Halfway around the world, in a forgotten operation over high mountains and dangerous terrain, we pioneered it and established it. Lord knows there were areas in the world where the idea of air transport might have been tested a little more easily, but the Hump was designated the scene of this great proving ground by the exigencies of war, and perhaps it was just as well. After that we knew air transport would work anywhere . . . Airlift proved itself not merely feasible, but practical, and superior to other transport in many ways.

One cannot leave the Hump without some discussion of "Operation Matterhorn." Matterhorn grew out of the development of the Boeing B-29 "Superfortress" and an early commitment to bring the war to the Japanese mainland. The struggle to develop the B-29 and the origins of the bombing campaign against Japan are far too complex to discuss here. Suffice to say that with the development of this bomber, the Army Air Forces found itself with a potent offensive weapon for use against Japan. The question was where to base the aircraft.

By mid-1943, estimates forecast that ten B-29 groups should be available by October 1944, but Pacific islands within the range of Japan would not be available under existing schedules. Might the bombers be profitably used in China, in the meantime, especially since the prestige of having the big bombers would also placate the growing demands of Chiang Kai-shek? The Mariana Islands were not expected to be available until March 1945. Thus, for a year, China was the only location that the B-29s could use within range of Japan, and this fact overrode the obvious problems posed by logistics. Army Air Forces planners began looking closely at basing the big bombers in the CBI.

In late September 1943, General Arnold directed the preparation of an operational plan for bombing Japan from China with the maximum number of B-29s at the earliest possible date. The resulting plan called for an initial wing of 100 B-29s operating from area around Chengtu, China. The first wing of what would become XX Bomber Command would begin operations about 1 April 1944, followed by a second wing in September.

The planners attempted to deal with the logistical problems posed by the CBI in an interesting and unique way. The B-29 force would be made as self-sufficient as possible. The bombers would be based in India, not China. Supplies of gasoline and other necessities would be prepositioned at the bases in China by the C-29 bombers themselves, supplemented by 20 C-87s.


Air-Supply drops like the one shown above were the keys to success in Burma operations.

The combat-loaded bombers would stage through the Chinese air fields, where they would be refueled and sent on to bomb Japan. Two other restrictions applied. None of the supplies prepositioned in China could be delivered at the expense of Tenth or Fourteenth Air Forces operations, and, of course everything had to be accomplished by air.

The basic premise of Matterhorn was sacrificed before the first B-29 reached India. In March 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to bypass Truk and seize the Marianas in mid-June 1944, substantially advancing the date for bombing Japan from the Pacific. This decision made the use of B-29s in China less attractive. Matterhorn was scaled back to the four groups of the 58th Bombardment Wing. The operation thus became less a serious attack on Japan than a training and shake-down effort that provided political support for Chiang Kai-shek and, also, might have some impact on the Japanese economy.

Work on the airfields for Matterhorn began in November 1943 using borrowed equipment. Ultimately, the construction force in India comprised some 6,000 U.S. engineer and construction troops and 27,000 civilians, and most of the airfields were ready for the first B-29s in April.

The advanced B-29 fields in China were located in the area around Chengtu, capitol of Sze-chwan province, 400 miles from Kunming. American and Chinese engineers supervised construction, while more than a third of a million Chinese men and women, working almost completely by hand, built the runways and other facilities. Work began in late January 1944 and the first B-29 landed on the field at Kwanghan on 24 April.

XX Bomber Command's aircraft flew the 11,500 miles from the United States to India with their combat crews, but the plan to carry all combat personnel by B-29 had to be scrapped because of the unreliability; of the bombers' engines. It proved more important for each B-29 to carry a spare engine. High priority passengers went on ATC aircraft by way of Natal, Khartoum, and Karachi, and the first contingent of 20 C-87s left the United States on 5 January with key personnel. Most personnel and supplies went by ship, however, some by way of North Africa and the Suez, others westward by way of Australia.

Initial spares estimates proved too low and ATC initiated a special airlift, "Mission 10," in which passengers and freight flew to Casablanca and then to Calcutta. Twenty-five C-54s were added to ATC's North African Wing for this effort, which lasted from 1 April through 1 June. It was just the beginning, however. Three squadrons of C-46s were also added to the delivery system. In April, the first of these squadrons arrived and was placed on the Hump run. The other two squadrons were assigned to the North African run, beginning the "Crescent Blend" service on 6 June that guaranteed XX Bomber Command 333 tons per month. ATC provided Matterhorn with an additional 50 tons of air supply through its "Fireball" service for high priority cargo, as well.

Despite such efforts, the buildup of supplies, especially in China, progressed slowly, and ultimately, proved insufficient to support sustained operations. Brig. Gen. Kenneth B. Wolfe, commander of XX Bomber Command, planned to have 6,000 tons stockpiled in China by 1 May to support two 100 plane strikes. Instead, he had received only about 4,000 tons. As of mid-May, the XX Bomber Command had flown 2,867 hours of B-29 time, of which 2,378 were on transport duty and only 439 in training for combat.


Mechanics repair a C-46 at night, the sun made metal too hot to touch during the day.

On 15 June, XX Bomber Command flew its first mission against Japan, bombing the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata in Kyushu. Of the 93 B-29s that departed Bengal, 79 reached China where they were refueled. Of the 75 that took off, 68 got airborne and 48 actually reached the target. Bomb damage was insignificant. By then, the handwriting was on the wall. The Mariana Islands became available much earlier than had been planned, and the bases in China became less valuable. XX Bomber Command flew its last mission out of China on 6 January 1945, although it continued to operate against targets in Southeast Asia from India until March. The results of MATTERHORN were minimal. Of 3,058 combat sorties, only 498 were against targets on the mainland of Japan. These delivered 961 tons of bombs.

Logistically, the premise that XX Bomber Command could be made self-sufficient proved illusionary. Attempts to use B-29s to haul supplies were unsuccessful. The command could not support its aircraft in India without substantial ATC support. It was a tribute to the capability and flexibility of its operations that ATC could make available. The bombers, even augmented by transports, could not preposition sufficient material in China to sustain operations. Further, using the B-29s in this manner distracted bomber personnel from their combat mission and wore the aircraft out, complicating the burdens placed on supply and maintenance. As ATC was demonstrating through its worldwide operations and General Tunner was exhibiting on the Hump, air logistics was a separate profession that required an expertise of its own. It was not a part-time job for amateurs.

The logistical problems of defeating the Japanese army in Burma were daunting. India, as we have seen, provided a weak base. It was a largely impoverished country with few useful resources, problematical weather, and poor sanitary conditions. Its primitive transportation system led primarily to the northwest frontier, and the British had made almost no preparation for fighting on the eastern border. Further, a significant portion of India's population was actively hostile to British rule. The British forces faced additional problems. Fourteenth Army covered a 700-mile front from the Chinese frontier to the Bay of Bengal. The largely unmapped area of the Indo-Burmese border comprised heavy jungle and steep, treacherous hills. It lacked roads and railroads, and for six months of the year monsoon rains made It almost Impenetrable. Gen. William Slim, commander of the Fourteenth Army, later wrote: "It could fairly be described as some of the world's worst country, breeding the world's worst diseases, and having for half the year at least the world's worst climate."

The British army had been defeated consistently by lightly-equipped Japanese troops that filtered through the jungle, flanking British positions and establishing blocks in the rear of the road-bound British troops. British dependence on motor transport, lack of ability to operate in the jungle, and poor training and equipment made it next to impossible to deal with these tactics, and the British army in Burma normally fought with one eye to the rear, hardly a prescription for victory. Air power would ultimately provide the best antidote to Japanese tactics.

The first break for the British came in early 1943, under one of its most unconventional officers, Orde Wingate. "Wingate was a strange, excitable, moody creature, but he had fire in him," General Slim later wrote. "He could ignite other men." Wingate had evolved the idea of a long range penetration force operating deep behind enemy lines and he based this tactic on the use of aircraft dropping supplies to his troops. In February 1943, he launched "Operation Longcloth."

For Longcloth, Wingate organized a special force of 3,000 men, the Chlndits, into self-contained columns, and assigned a Royal Air Force section to each column to coordinate airdrops. The Chindits entered Burma on foot in three groups on 13 February, and received their first airdrop, 35 tons of supplies, three days later.

For the next few weeks, they meandered around in the Japanese rear areas, blowing up railroads, bridges, supply dumps, and other targets. Ultimately, the Japanese defeated some of the columns and forced the others to disperse. With the columns split, radios lost or failed, and the harried remnants moving quickly, air supply failed in the last days of the expedition, and the last survivors drifted back into India by June. Of 3,000 men, only 2,182 returned.

The Chindits paid a high price, and their first operation was widely considered a failure in every way except on psychological grounds. Despite the heavy losses, British leaders concluded that Longcloth had proven that properly trained and equipped British soldiers could defeat the enemy in the jungle. For the first time, the British concluded, they had beaten the Japanese at their own game. And the use of aerial supply made this result possible. Wingate would be heard from again. By the end of 1943, the number of transport squadrons available to support British operations in India and Burma had increased dramatically. Lord Mountbatten integrated his air forces with British Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse in command and American Gen. George E. Stratemeyer as his deputy. Stratemeyer, in turn, commanded Eastern Air Command, and under him Brig. Gen. William D. Old commanded the joint American-British Troop Carrier Command. The creation of Eastern Air Command, which united Tenth Air Force with Royal Air Force (RAF) Bengal Command, on 15 December 1943 brought all American and British air units under one command for the first time.

By January 1944, Stratemeyer had 532 RAF and 287 Army Air Forces aircraft, including 576 fighters, 70 medium bombers, 79 heavy bombers, 10 reconnaissance aircraft, and 84 transports. This gave the Allies a preponderance of air power over the estimated hundred or so Japanese fighters in Burma and made tactical air transport operations possible. General Old took command of Troop Carrier Command under the new organization in January 1944. In the meantime, during the fall of 1943, the British XV Corps, consisting of the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions, advanced down the coast in Arakan toward Akyab. In October, General Slim directed that a formation be sent down the Kaladan River to protect the invasion's left flank independent of the main advance. The terrain dictated that this force, the 81st West African Division could be supplied only by air, and Slim later claimed that this was the first time that a standard formation at divisional level was "committed to complete air maintenance." It should not be the last.

The British advance was a threat the Japanese army could not ignore, and its response at the beginning of February 1944 caught the British by surprise. The Japanese attack on XV Corps was a bold and resourceful right hook that cut off the 7th Indian Division, blocked its line of communications, and threatened to destroy the command in classic fashion. By 7 February, 7th Indian Division was surrounded; however, in contrast to previous battles, the force neither panicked nor retreated. Instead, Slim put 7th Division totally on air supply.

The newly integrated Troop Carrier Command reacted immediately. Japanese fighters forced the first flight of C-47s back; however, General Old personally led the second attempt while RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes flew cover. This effort succeeded, and the tactical airlift began. C-47s flew three to four sorties a day, often at night to avoid fighters. Army supply units prepared the loads and mechanics served the aircraft around the clock. ATC supplemented Troop Carrier Command's aircraft with 25 C-46s diverted from the Hump. While 7th Indian Division held its positions under ferocious attacks, Slim ordered 26th Indian Division and later 36th British Division against the rear of the Japanese blocking force. Attempts to reinforce and resupply the Japanese force were Interdicted either by patrols on the ground or from the air. Attempts to wrest control of the air from the Allies were defeated in the largest air battles fought to date. Ultimately, the Japanese force was almost completely destroyed, and XVth Corps passed to the offensive, throwing the Japanese out of prepared positions. Slim later wrote that:

"This Arakan battle . . . was not of great magnitude, but it was one of the historic successes of British arms. It was the turning point of the Burma campaign. For the first time a British force had met, held, and decisively defeated a major Japanese attack, and followed this up by driving the enemy out of the strongest possible natural positions that they had been preparing for months . . . It was a victory . . . and its effect, not only on the troops engaged but on the whole Fourteenth Army, was immense."

General Stratemeyer, in the meantime, wrote General Arnold that, "All in authority here are convinced that General Old's Troop Carrier Command . . . was to a large extent responsible for the success of the battle."

Air supply of troops cut off by Japanese attacks became the standard. During the major Japanese offensive against Imphal and Kohima in northern India from March through July 1944, Fourteenth Army took impressive advantage of its rapidly expanding air transport capability to supply cut off units, borrowing aircraft diverted from the Hump when necessary. This approach was doubly effective because the Japanese army normally launched its attacks based upon the slenderest of logistical threads, counting on the seizure of enemy supplies and transport and upon quick victory for success. Air power and tactical air supply denied them those conditions. Further, the Allies extended the use of air transport to deliver reinforcements to threatened areas and to support units as they attacked through the rough terrain.

At the height of the Japanese offensive, Orde Wingate struck again with a vastly expanded Chindit force and an imposing battle plan. Wingate's force included an infantry strength of six brigades and featured its own air force. Longcloth had depended on air support, but the second Chindit expedition, "Operation Thursday," went Longcloth one better. Wingate planned to land most of his force by glider deep behind Japanese lines at specially selected locations. There they would establish strongholds, hack out primitive airfields for air support, and operate mobile columns against the Japanese rear areas. Wingate's goal was to sever the supply lines to the Japanese forces in northern Burma. The air component was the unique contribution of "Operation Thursday."

The 1st Air Commando unit, under Col. Philip G. Cochran, was a composite force comprised of 13 C-47s, 12 C-46s, 12 B-25H Mitchell medium bombers, 30 P-51A Mustang fighter-bombers, 100 L-l and L-5 light aircraft, 6 helicopters, and 225 gliders. General Old's Troop Carrier Command was also available. Wingate's force began its movement on 5 March and, despite serious losses, the first base at "Broadway" was soon secure, American engineers had cleared a landing strip, and General Old brought the first C-47s in to the site. Chindits began arriving at a second site, "Chowringhee," on the 6th. At the end of some 600 sorties, 9,000 men, 1,400 mules, and two artillery troops had been inserted into the heart of Japanese territory.

The Japanese 5th Air Division, attacked Chowringee on 10 March with 20 fighters and two light bombers and Broadway on 13 March with 55 fighters and three light bombers, but by then antiaircraft guns and fighter aircraft operating from Broadway opposed the attack. By 20 March, Chindit columns sustained entirely by air were operating throughout the In-daw area.

Ultimately, Chindit forces established other strongholds, designated "Blackpool," "White City," and "Aberdeen." Soon the railroad around Indaw was cut, Japanese supply depots were burning, and Allied aircraft dominated the skies. Ultimately, however, the Chindits failed to achieve their main goal, complete isolation of the Japanese 18th Division, and on 29 April they began withdrawing. The last of the force flew out in August.

The success of the composite 1st Air Commando and the troop carrier units led to plans for the establishment of additional air commando units designed to deliver an assault force and its equipment directly into combat, and a wing of four "combat cargo groups" specially trained to supply the ground force while in action and evacuate casualties.

The Army Air Forces activated four combat cargo groups in mid-1944. One participated successfully in tactical operations in Burma while the others augmented the Hump operations in late 1944-early 1945. Troop Carrier Command absorbed the combat cargo units after the war.

The impact of the operations in CBI on tactical air logistics was immense, and perhaps is best described by the commander of Fourteenth Army, General Slim:

"A most distinctive aspect of oar Burma war was the great use we made of our air transport. It was one of our contributions toward a new kind of warfare, and I think it fair to say that, to a large extent, we discovered by trial and error the methods of air supply that later passed into general use. We were the first to maintain large formations in action by air supply and to move standard divisions long distances about the fighting front by air ... To us, all this was as normal as moving or maintaining troops by railway or road, and that attitude of mind was, I suppose, one of our main reformations."

Ultimately, the legacy of World War II for American logistics validated two separate organizations. The success of ATC around the world and especially of airlift to China over the Hump validated the role of Air Transport Command as a worldwide military airline. The tactical success of airborne operations in the Mediterranean and Europe and the success of tactical air operations in Burma, especially aerial supply of units locked in combat, validated the role of the troop carrier units. Following the war, unification in strategic air transport did take place.

In June 1948, the newly independent U.S. Air Force's Air Transport Command was combined with the U.S. Navy's strategic air transport service to form Military Air Transport Service (MATS). A proposal to combine all air transport under MATS and eliminate the troop carrier units failed to gain support, however, and strategic and tactical airlift remained separate within the U.S. Air Force until the 1960s.

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